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Abstract. The spread of misinformation online is specifically amplified by use 
of social media, yet the tools for allowing online users to authenticate text and 
images are available though not easily accessible. The authors challenge this 
view suggesting that corporations’ responsible for the development of browsers 
and social media websites need to incorporate such tools to combat the spread 
of misinformation. As a step stone towards developing a formula for simulating 
spread of misinformation, the authors ran theoretical simulations which demon-
strate the unchallenged spread of misinformation which users are left to authen-
ticate on their own, as opposed to providing the users means to authenticate 
such material. The team simulates five scenarios that gradually get complicated 
as variables are identified and added to the model. The results demonstrate a 
simulation of the process as proof-of-concept as well as identification of the key 
variables that influence the spread and combat of misinformation online. 
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1 Introduction 
The process by which information and misinformation travels online and specifi-
cally by social media users has been the subject of several publications [1,2,3,4,5]. The 
challenges in combating misinformation on social media could be greatly enhanced 
should researchers be able to simulate the different scenarios of information and misin-
formation cascades. Specifically here, researchers need to consider the factors involved 
in the travel of misinformation and the factors involved in combating the spread of 
misinformation. In this paper, the authors identify the factors that influence the travel 
of information and misinformation as both theoretically start from one single node and 
travel across a network of nodes and points. Variables are identified for which the 
authors develop a fuller picture of what influences the process, speed, and success pace 
of fighting misinformation online. In the process of identifying these variables, the 
team simulates five scenarios as new variables are identified with each simulation and 
added to the model.  
2 Literature Review 
Oxford Internet Survey of 2013 results show online social networks as becoming 
one of the key sources of information and news especially among younger generations 
[6]. Thus, the spread of misinformation has increased as a result of the increase in the 
number of people using social networks [7]. Due to the lack of accountability of social 
media users spreading information and not having appropriate filtering techniques 
similar to reviewing and editing information in traditional publishing, social media 
have become a significant media for the spread of misinformation [4]. Thus, the spread 
of diverse forms of information, misinformation, and propaganda involves the distribu-
tion of false information through an information diffusion process involving users of 
social networks where the majority of users may not be attentive to the untruth story. 
In one study, researchers state that the acceptance of misleading information by the 
people greatly depends on their prior beliefs and opinions [8]. In another study [9], 
researchers state that the spread of misinformation in online social networks is context 
specific with topics such as health, politics, finances, theology, and technology trends 
are key sources of misinformation. People believe things which support their past 
thoughts without questioning them [10]. We have used the term misinformation to 
denote any type of false information spreading in social networks. 
Considering the dark side of social networks, the environment facilitates the ar-
rangement of groups and campaigns with the intention of undertaking unethical activi-
ties as well as mimicking widespread information diffusion behavior [4],[10]. Conse-
quently, this facilitation of potential misconducts in online environments has encour-
aged some users to spread misinformation that results in greater support to cult-like 
views in a variety of topics [5].  What is more, those views are sometimes contagious 
and the individuals behind them make great efforts to spread them to others. The per-
sistence of misinformation in the society is dangerous and requires analysis for its 
prevention and early detection [10,11,12]. The lack of accountability and verifiability 
however afford the users an excellent opportunity to spread specific ideas through the 
network while not discouraging freedom of expression and freedom of ideas [4].  
In online social networks, the enormous distribution of data has resulted in persistent 
pockets of misinformation. Thus finding reliable information requires sifting-out the 
different types of misinformation in online social networks which has become a com-
putationally puzzling task [10]. 
2.1 Related Work 
In a research conducted by Lee et al. [1], the authors aimed at identifying and engag-
ing “information propagators” which refers to people willing to help propagate infor-
mation on social media. By modelling their characteristics and using that model to 
predict their willingness to propagate information in the future, the authors have been 
able to identify three characteristics of people willing to propagate information and 
misinformation online. These characteristics are: (1) personal traits of users such as 
personality and readiness to share or pass on that information; (2) the wait-time of a 
user based on the previous time lapses between passing on the information to predict 
the next time they share that information again; and (3) a recommender system based 
on the two previous components to select the right set of users with a high likelihood 
of Re-sharing of information. While the paper focuses on Twitter as an example, par-
allels could be drawn to other social media applications.  
In a research conducted by Hoang and Lim [2], the authors aimed to identify and 
model factors that contribute to viral diffusion based on the interrelationships among 
items, users, and the user-user network. This time the team categorized these factors 
into two sets. The first set includes external factors such as advertising, while the 
second set includes internal factors such as: a) Item virality which is the ability of an 
item to spread the adoptions by users through the follow links; b) the virality of the 
users diffusing the item which is their ability to spread the adoptions to other users 
through the follow links; and c) the susceptibility of the user adopting the item, which 
is the ability of a user to adopt items easily as other neighbouring users diffuse the 
items to others. The authors then proposed a Mutual Dependency Model that 
measures all three factors above simultaneously based on a set of principles that help 
to distinguish each property from others in viral diffusion. 
In a research conducted by Jin et al. [3] the authors applied epidemiological model-
ling techniques to understand information diffusion on Twitter, in relation to the 
spread of both news and rumours. Epidemiological models are usually used to better 
understand how information diffuses by dividing users into several groups that reflect 
their statuses. The possible groups in which a user has been classified are:  susceptible 
(S), exposed (E), infected (I), and recovered (R). Users could move from one group to 
another with a certain probability that could be estimated from data. Several models 
were introduced such as the SI model in which a susceptible (S) user can get infected 
(I) by one of his neighbours and will stay permanently in this state; SIS model where 
users can move back and forth between being (S) susceptible and (I) infected; the SIR 
model where users could move to a recover (R) state which is not really used to in 
news cascades models; and a model called SEIZ model (susceptible, exposed, infect-
ed, sceptic) proposed originally by Bettencourt et al. (2006) [13] which added a new 
state: exposed (E). Jin et al. (2013) suggested instead to represent the case where a 
user may take some time while in the exposed (E) state before believing a rumour (i.e. 
move to an infected (I) state). 
For simulating spread of misinformation online, Budak et al. [4] presented a network 
algorithm that could be tested in case of two competing campaigns using two varia-
tions of the Independent Cascade Model (ICM) termed: (1) Multi-Campaign Inde-
pendent Cascade Model (MCICM) and (2) Campaign-Oblivious Independent Cascade 
(COICM) to consider how information and misinformation spreads online. The paper, 
theoretically, relies on the design of the system itself and the input of ‘influential’ 
people to counter ‘bad’ campaign and limit misinformation. This could potentially be 
useful during time-sensitive political campaigns or breaking news events. Budak et al. 
acknowledge a limitation shared by other publications in this area when it comes to 
lab modelling of information diffusion acknowledging that lab models may not reflect 
the full extent of influences in real life. Thus, lab simulations will still need to be 
tested in the real world of social media [4] p. 667. 
While previous work has provided important literature into the behaviour and chal-
lenges of spreading and combating misinformation online, there does not seem to be 
one uniform method to how the spread of information is modelled. Nor does there 
seem to be uniformed agreed method for modelling the spread of misinformation. In 
addition, despite repeated review of the literature, the team could not find any viable 
or applied proposal on how to combat the spread of misinformation online. 
2.2 The ‘Right-click Authenticate’ in combating misinformation online 
In a prior publication [5], the authors suggested an approach to combating 
misinformation on social media. The team proposed an automated approach, dubbed as 
‘Right-click Authenticate’ option that could review, rank, and identify misinformation 
using tools already found online. However, these tools have not been combined 
together in a setup that helps online users in their pursuit of authentication of the 
information they view. Three categories of authentication have been identified: textual, 
imagery, and video misinformation, however the paper focused on the first two: 
Textual and imagery authentication. In that process, users who are unsure about the 
content could right-click and select authenticate as conceptualized in figure 1. 
Using reverse image search [14], a search that requires the user to upload an image or 
copy the image’s web address to search for matches to that actual image online, users 
are able to identify the sources and dates of the first appearances of that image online 
as well as the context in which the image is presented. Some of the highly refined re-
verse image searches are able to detect even modifications of the image including color 
tones changes, photo editing, cropping and writing made onto the original image. 
Second layer is to validate any meta-data linked with the questioned image including 
the camera used, date it was created, and what photo-editing tools have been used. 
Meta-data may also help detect if any image editing tools have been used [15,16]. 
 
Fig. 1. Conceptualizing a right-click ‘Authenticate’ option  [5] 
The third part is an editorial feedback written in the same format and style Wikipedia 
operates authentication of information [17] with regards to the authenticity of that 
image. Image editorial feedback is combine with explanations based on the origin, 
date, meta-data, where the image appears online, or article that dismisses or confirms 
that image. Finally, a crowdsourcing of feedback is represent the final indication on 
what the majority of users judging this information. These four sections are combined 
as: Image Match, Image Metadata, Editorial, and Feedback respectively. The solution 
is the bundling of these four sections into one single right-click option as 
conceptualized in figure 2. To ensure the successful results, the same algorithm used 
for online search engines to be used here. Thus, images that get frequently selected as a 
match to get higher ranking than those images that do not get selected as a match. 
 
Fig. 2.  Conceptualization of the ‘Authenticate’ outcome [5] 
The right-click search authenticate option can also be used to authenticate a selection 
of news by title or text since the option to select and search text is already a well-
established right-click search option on variety of browsers [5]. Another benefit for 
this right-click authenticate for images and text is that copyright infringements on 
intellectual rights are become more easily detected. In the paper, the authors 
acknowledge that new images and breaking news to require longer time to be authen-
ticated. This proposal just based on theory and has not been simulated, implemented, 
or tested. 
3 Research Questions and Methodology 
The team acknowledges that the ‘right-click authenticate’ method for tackling the 
spread of misinformation needs to be demonstrated and proven as proof-of-concept. 
This paper attempts to further develop this theory to answer some key questions: 
1. What variables are influencing the spread of information and misinformation on 
social media? 
2. By means of simulation, can the process by which information and misinformation 
be modeled as proof-of-concept? 
The team used graph theory computational simulation with observational research 
method [18]. In the process of identifying variables, the team used reflective analysis 
[19] to review progressively different scenarios in the spread of information and misin-
formation on social media. This approach is comparable to other approaches identified 
in the literature [1,2,3,4].  
In lab conditions, the team observed the different two-dimensional simulations of in-
formation as it travelled from the source to a theoretical maximum reach. The two-
dimensional simulation represents a slice of what a real-world multi-dimensional simu-
lation of information would likely resemble. Successively analyzing and observing 
simulations of scenarios, the team subsequently evolved their model of simulation to 
identify and introduce new variables. With the introduction of new variables, a reflec-
tive analysis considered the logical impact of the new variable. Changes to the simula-
tion and the justifications are then considered. While conducting the simulation, the 
team suggested values for such variables that are not based on any specific scenario or 
research, but solely for the purpose of facilitating a reflective analysis to re-evaluate 
the simulation and considering missing factors. 
 One of the main assumptions agreed at the start of the simulation is that the phe-
nomena by which information and misinformation travels can be simulated despite 
unpredictability generally dominating human behavior online. This assumption is 
consistent with other academic publishers in this area of research. Without a preset of 
simulation scenario or the number of variables, the team developed five simulations 
and identified a total of ten variables. The demonstration, simulation, and identifica-
tion of variables presented in this paper will be extended in further research aiming to 
design a formula by which success rate of combating misinformation online could be 
used for computational simulation. 
4 Variables and Graph Modelling 
Spread of misinformation in social networks can be modeled by using graph theo-
ry. The team considered a weighted directed graph 𝐺 =  (𝑉, 𝐸) consisting of 𝑉 verti-
ces and edges 𝐸. 𝑉 can be viewed as the users of the social network. Among the verti-
ces in 𝑉, the team distinguishes two types of vertices: 
(1) Vertices which belong to set 𝑆, the set of sharing vertices, which represents users 
that send and receive information;  
(2) Vertices which belong to set 𝑅, the set of reading vertices, which represents users 
who only receive information- accordingly 𝑅 ⊆  𝑆. A vertice 𝑟 is a neighbor of a 
vertice 𝑠 if and only if there is 𝑒𝑠,𝑟 ∈ 𝐸, an edge from 𝑟 to 𝑠 in 𝐺. Furthermore, all 
vertices from 𝑉 can be divided into subsets (layers) depending on length 𝑙. Where 
𝑉 =  𝑉1  ∪  𝑉2  ∪ … ∪ 𝑉𝑙 from figure 3. 
 Fig. 3.  Graph of Misinformation Modeling 
Assuming 𝑖 and 𝑗 are any vertices of the given graph, the vertices 𝑖 and 𝑗𝑛 are con-
nected by certain chains of edges going through different layers. The main goal of the 
team’s approach is to see the effect of cascade labeling in models that they created. 
Note that cascade labeling symbolizes pressing the Right-click 'Authenticate'. 
As illustrated in figure 3, by selecting edge 𝑒, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑒 ∈  𝐸, the entire sub graph 𝐺′, 
from 𝑘1 ∈  𝑉2 to 𝑗1  ∈  𝑉𝑙, where 𝑙 stands for length, is colored in red. This step is 
known as cascade labeling. Subsequently, this cascade labeling results in coloring 
some of the vertices from 𝐺 into red. Coloring in red symbolizes the node authentica-
tion of the information to be untrue and the exclusion of sharing misinformation. The 
authors assume that pressing the ‘Right-click Authenticate' can happen more than 
once in a demonstrated model.   
Given graph 𝐺 by sequentially repeating the cascade labeling process i.e. pressing the 
‘Right-click Authenticate' button, the number of vertices colored in red increases 
while the number of vertices colored in black decreases. 
Since selecting an edge 𝑒 results in coloring some vertices of sub graph 𝐺′ into red, 
repeating the same process on any other edge from 𝐸 in a graph 𝐺 will result in color-
ing some more vertices into red.  
Eventually, after 𝑛 repetitions of this process in graph 𝐺, all vertices from subset 𝑉𝑙 
can be colored in red. Therefore, by implying cascade labeling procedure, some of the 
destination vertices 𝑗1, 𝑗2, … , 𝑗𝑛 will be preserved of receiving misinformation. 
The model in figure 3 is assuming that only one vertex authenticates the information 
and passes that information on. The first vertex to authenticate and turn from black to 
red is modeled as red with black line and labeled as vertex 𝑠2 ∈ 𝑆2, where 𝑆2  ⊆  𝑉2.  
The extended version of that model is shown in figure 4.  
 Fig. 4.  Extended Graph of Misinformation Modeling 
In the next scenario, the team studied next three variables that need to be considered in 
combating misinformation online: rate of authentication, rate of sharing, and rate of 
cross-wire. 
The rate of Authentication (𝐴) is a variable that represents the rate of users willing to 
authenticate the information. This usually occurs when online users are not sure of an 
information or when they get conflicting information. Thus, these users might decide 
to authenticate such information to start a correction cascade or at least stop the 
cascade of misinformation from their part.  
The rate of Authentication (𝐴)  could be anything between 0 and 100%; although the 
team acknowledges it is unlikely to be either extreme. For the simulation in figure 5, 
the team predicts that the percentage of users who will authenticate to be around 30%. 
Thus for the simulation purposes, the team have assumed the probability of authentica-
tion as 𝐴 = 0.3.  
The passing on Rate (𝑃) is a variable that represents the ratio of users who read the 
information and then perform an action of actively disseminate it further. Thus, the 
ratio shows the probability that vertex which authenticate will pass that correct infor-
mation to anyone else as well as the ratio of those vertex that pass on misinformation.  
The synonyms used for passing on rate are average of forwarding, liking, and sharing 
rate. We assume that the rate of willingness to share is probably the same for those 
who believe the misinformation. To demonstrate this scenario, the team assumed the 
probability of sharing information by online users regardless they believe it or not to 
be 𝑃 = 0.5. Although if the research determines differences in sharing between those 
who believe and those who do not believe the information, variations of this variable 
could be created as 𝑃1 for those who believe the information to be true and 𝑃𝑜 for those 
who do not believe it. 
The Cross-Wire (𝐶𝑤) is a variable that represents the probability that user who re-
ceived different information from different sources will react to validate. In such a 
case, online users exposed to misinformation are sufficiently skeptical to question it 
and use the ‘Right-click Authenticate’ to validate it. In figure 5 vertex 𝑐1 received dif-
ferent information from sources 𝑎 and 𝑏 and accept the information received from 𝑎 
while discard the misinformation received from 𝑏. 
 
Fig. 5.  The Authenticate, Passing on rate, and Cross-Wire rate simulation 
For the purpose of simulation, the team assumed 𝐶𝑤 = 0.3. The simulation in figure 5 
shows the usage of variables 𝐴, 𝑃 and 𝐶𝑤. Moreover, the figure shows how the speed 
of misinformation spread is slowed down compared to the scenario in figure 4 and 
again for those who authenticate the information. 
As demonstrated in figure 5, providing means of authentication can have important 
impact on the spread of misinformation online. Red nodes are shown to be playing a 
role in limiting the spread of misinformation.  
For the next simulation, the team considers Same Level Communication (𝑆𝑙) as a vari-
able that represents the probability that users who authenticate information and leave 
feedback encourages other users from the same level also to authenticate. That includes 
passing on vertices on the same level thus turning several of these vertices from black 
to red. For example, in figure 6, vertices 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 have validated the misinformation. 
Provided 𝑐1 or 𝑐2 left a feedback, this turns the remaining vertices from black to red. 
The same happens to 𝑐3, 𝑐4, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐5 . 
The team assumes that all other variables and assumptions are kept in place.  
A vertex that is red or just turned red with probability 0.5 will alert other online users 
that the information is not true. In such scenario, the team assumes that other vertices 
will, in turn, discard the misinformation and turn into red. The reason behind this as-
sumption is that the first online user to authenticate has a greater impact on subse-
quence online users. So the team assumed that probability of Same Level Communica-
tion is 𝑆𝑙 = 1. 
Considering the rate of authentication 𝐴, passing on information rate 𝑃, average cross-
wire rate 𝐶𝑤, success rate of Same Level communication rate 𝑆𝑙, where 𝐴 = 0.3, 𝑃 =
0.5, 𝐶𝑤 = 0.3, and 𝑆𝑙 = 1 respectively, excluding misinformation does not extend 
beyond 𝑉4. The simulation of this scenario specific lab scenario, demonstrated in figure 
6, where at level 𝑉4 all vertices are red.  
  
Fig. 6.  Reverse Validation (𝑅𝑣).    Fig 7. Same Level Communication (𝑆𝑙) 
For the final simulation, the authors have considered Reverse Validation (𝑅𝑣) Varia-
ble. 𝑅𝑣 represents a probability that the user who initially believed the misinformation, 
while being informed by other users through their feedback that the information is not 
true, either removes the post or rectify the post, thus turning red node themselves. 
However, to differentiate them from other red node, the team decided to label such 
node green. This is a backflow to a previous or source vertex. The output of applying 
the 𝑅𝑣, is shown in figure 7 as green vertices. The team considered this final variable 
at probability that the source vertex will take action to rectify the misinformation 
as 𝑅𝑣 = 0.5. 
5 Results and Limitations 
The combinations of all these variables and the assumptions that the team made to 
understand how combating misinformation works has resulted in identifying some key 
variables where 𝑖 is the first vertex and 𝑗𝑛 is the last vertex of the given simulation. 𝑉1 
represents the first phase of spread of misinformation and 𝑙 represents the maximum 
possible reach of information through the network. The authors conclude that 
combating misinformation online is also be influenced by the following variables: rate 
of authentication 𝐴, passing on information rate 𝑃, average cross-wire rate 𝐶𝑤, success 
rate of Same Level communication rate 𝑆𝑙, and Reverse Validation rate 𝑅𝑣. Thus the 
paper demonstrates by means of simulation how misinformation travels online. The 
paper also shows how ‘right-click authenticate’ process can reduce the spread of misin-
formation online. Thus suggesting a viable solution for combating misinformation 
online by identifying and demonstrating key variables and factors.  
The proof-of-concept has been constrained with assumptions that are based mostly 
on observations of computer simulation and reflective analysis subjective to individu-
al experiences of the team. However, the approach has been backed by similar obser-
vations done in other academic publications [1, 2, 3]. The team acknowledges that the 
proposed variables may not be exclusive, and that further research may reveal addi-
tional factors influencing the travel of information and the means of combating misin-
formation online. Furthermore, the identification of the variables is lab based and 
further proof should be drawn from examples from existent event observations once 
the formula is developed. This is a limitation acknowledged in the literature when it 
comes to lab modeling as opposed to real life simulation [4]. The ‘right-click authen-
ticate’ process has two key limitations in application and implementation [5]. In ap-
plication, the authors acknowledge that the ‘authentication’ option has little or no real 
impact at authenticating breaking news. For the process to work, time is needed for 
the information or image to be authenticated and a review written. For the implemen-
tation limitation, the building of the ‘right-click authenticate’ option requires authori-
zation and collaboration from a reverse image search engine, which may not be forth 
coming. 
6 Conclusion 
The team set out to demonstrate a proof-of-concept and identified the variables 
involved in the travel of information and the ‘Right-click Authenticate’ idea suggested 
in a previous publication [5]. The team believes that some headway has been achieved 
but that still work to be done to develop the formula and conduct simulations to further 
validate the concept. Two parallel lines of further research are expected to follow. 
First, the team will be working towards developing the formula and run computational 
simulations of the formula using MATLAB and BioLayout Express for three dimen-
sional simulation. Second and equally important, the team intend to develop a 
prototype browser based on an existing open source applications that allows 
demonstration of the concept and the running of actual simulations thus allowing lab 
and field simulations.  
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